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Abstract
Stress testing, at its most general level, is an investigation of the performance of an entity under
abnormal operating conditions. The authors focus on one set of entities—the Canadian banking
sector—and investigate losses in the loans portfolio of this sector as a function of changing
circumstances in the different industries in which these loans reside. These circumstances are
characterized by means of one summary measure—sectoral probabilities of default—and this
measure is modelled as a function of macroeconomic variables. Using this model, the authors
assess the interrelationship between the macroeconomic environment and sectoral defaults, and
perform a series of stress tests under different scenarios that are thought to be most pertinent to
Canada. The tools underlying the authors’ analysis are general and can be applied to other
countries, as well as to other macroeconomic scenarios.
JEL classiﬁcation: C15, G21, G33
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial stability; Financial institutions
Résumé
La conduite de simulations de crise (stress testing) sert de façon générale à évaluer la performance
d’une entité dans des conditions de fonctionnement anormales. Les auteurs centrent leur analyse
sur le secteur bancaire canadien, en reliant les pertes sur le portefeuille des prêts bancaires aux
modiﬁcations de l’environnement dans lequel les différents secteurs d’activité bénéﬁciaires de ces
prêts évoluent. Les caractéristiques de l’environnement sont résumées au moyen d’un indicateur
— la probabilité de défaut dans chaque secteur — qui est modélisé sous la forme d’une fonction
de variables macroéconomiques. À l’aide de ce modèle, les auteurs évaluent les liens réciproques
entre le contexte macroéconomique et les défaillances d’entreprises dans chacun des secteurs, et
mènent une série de simulations selon divers scénarios de crise jugés pertinents dans le cas
canadien. Les outils sur lesquels repose l’analyse des auteurs sont de nature générale et peuvent
être appliqués à d’autres pays ainsi qu’à d’autres scénarios macroéconomiques.
Classiﬁcation JEL : C15, G21, G33
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Stabilité ﬁnancière; Institutions ﬁnancières1. Introduction
Stress testing, at its most general level, is an investigation of the performance of an entity
under abnormal operating conditions. The objective of such an exercise is to identify potential
vulnerabilities. Precise speci￿cation of the key components￿ entity, performance indicators,
and operating conditions￿ depends on the nature of the exercise and one￿ s concerns.
From a ￿nancial stability viewpoint, the entity of interest is the ￿nancial system, and the
ultimate objective of stress tests is to assess the performance of the ￿nancial system under
abnormal operating conditions. The ￿nancial system, however, is a complex entity consisting
of a wide range of ￿nancial institutions, ￿nancial markets, and payments and settlement sys-
tems, and it is not easily amenable to aggregate analysis. In practice, the analysis of ￿nancial
system stability focuses on individual components, most often the ￿nancial institutions, to
arrive at an overall assessment of the ￿nancial system.
In this paper, the focus of analysis is the Canadian banking sector￿ a natural place to
start, especially in Canada, given the size of this sector and its importance in the ￿nan-
cial system. Whereas it might be debatable whether a particular ￿nancial institution is
￿systemically important,￿the systemic importance of the banking sector as a whole is not
controversial.1
In investigating the performance of the banking sector, one can follow either a bottom-up
or a top-down approach. The bottom-up approach consists of examining the performance of
individual banks and aggregating the results, whereas the top-down approach involves looking
at the banking sector as a whole. Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, and
the decision regarding which to pursue depends to some extent on one￿ s views about the
nature and causes of ￿nancial instability.2 In this work, we follow the top-down approach, on
the premise that systemic vulnerabilities can result from common exposures, whether from
exposures to similar classes of assets or, ultimately, similar risk factors.
It is important to emphasize that the two approaches are best viewed as complements
rather than substitutes. The implications of the common risk factors for individual institu-
tions can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis. Collecting these results and comparing
them with the top-down approach would help us identify the externalities, if any, not taken
into account at the individual level. The reverse is true as well: sources of vulnerabilities
1See Gauthier and St-Amant (2005) for a discussion of systemic risk and ￿nancial instability.
2Borio (2005) contains an excellent description of two di⁄erent views on ￿nancial stability and its causes.
1identi￿ed by individual institutions might be quite informative, since they may turn out to
be systemic.
Key to the identi￿cation of vulnerabilities is scenario selection. By scenario we mean an
event (for example, an increase in interest rates)￿ and, possibly, its broader implications￿
that is believed to represent abnormal operating conditions. Scenarios can be chosen based
on historical experience, or they can be hypothetical. In either case, the objective is to select
as scenarios those rare but plausible events that have caused abnormal operating conditions
in the past, or that could cause them in the future. The scenarios chosen in this paper re￿ ect
sources of vulnerabilities that are commonly considered ￿ typical￿for Canada, rather than a
re￿ ection of the ￿ concerns of the moment.￿Of course, at a given point in time, the views on
the possible sources of risk may necessitate an analysis of di⁄erent scenarios. These can be
accommodated within the model developed in this paper in a straightforward manner.
The impact of di⁄erent scenarios on the ￿nancial system is quanti￿ed by examining a set
of performance indicators. The choice of indicators is closely related to the approach one takes
to stress testing. In this paper, we opt for the portfolio approach and use two performance
indicators￿ expected losses, and maximum losses at a given con￿dence level￿ based on the
loss distribution for the loans portfolio of the banking sector.3
In this paper, we consider the aggregate loans portfolio of Canadian banks as a function
of the macroeconomic environment and conduct stress tests at the aggregate level. The work
most closely related to ours is that of Virolainen (2004), who performs a similar exercise for
the Finnish banking sector. Our work di⁄ers from Virolainen￿ s as follows: (i) we do not model
macroeconomic variables in isolation, but rather use a vector-autoregression (VAR) model,
which allows us to capture the impact of a change in one variable on the rest of the economy,
(ii) we introduce lags in the default rate regression, allowing for the delayed impact of changes
in macroeconomic variables on defaults, and (iii) we use industry-level simulation to assess
the impact on portfolio losses, rather than generate defaults at the individual-company level.
These modi￿cations and their bearing on the results are explained in sections 2￿ 4.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the main approaches to
stress testing and place some of the existing literature in a broader context. In section 3 we
describe the details of our model. Section 4 contains a detailed description of the data and a
preliminary statistical analysis. In section 5 we describe the macroeconomic scenarios selected
for the stress-testing exercise. In section 6 the main results are presented and discussed. In
3Details of this approach are provided in section 2.
2section 7 we o⁄er a summary and outline possible extensions of this work.
2. An Overview of the Approaches to Stress Testing
As mentioned earlier, the choice of performance indicators is closely related to the approach
used for stress testing. To make this fact transparent, the approaches to stress testing found
in the literature are divided into two groups:
(i) a balance-sheet approach, and
(ii) a portfolio approach.
The common trait of these approaches is that they seek to explain a set of indicators
of ￿nancial position for an individual institution or a sector in terms of some underlying
variables. These variables are commonly referred to as risk factors. The risk factors we are
interested in are macroeconomic variables, and the following discussion will describe these
approaches as relating di⁄erent indicators to these variables.
Balance-sheet approach
The main idea behind this approach is to explain a chosen set of balance-sheet indicators
in terms of a set of macroeconomic variables. The nature of indicators and explanatory
variables varies from model to model and depends on one￿ s interests and priors. Dey (2006)
seeks to explain the returns on equity of the banking sector; Hoggarth et al. (2005) seek
to explain the writeo⁄s-to-loans ratio; Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) use loan-loss provisions.
Monnin (2005) and Misina and Tkacz (2006), rather than relying on a single indicator, use
an index that is composed of balance-sheet and ￿nancial indicators, and try to explain it
in terms of macro variables. The explanatory variables considered di⁄er across studies, but
commonly include domestic GDP, a measure of in￿ ation, and short-term interest rates. To
these are occasionally added exchange rates, a measure of monetary aggregates, and various
asset prices, depending on the features of the economy, as well as on the indicator whose
behaviour the author seeks to explain.
3Portfolio approach
Under the portfolio approach, asset holdings of an institution or a sector are viewed as a
portfolio whose risk characteristics are summarized in terms of a loss distribution. The idea
behind this approach is to relate loss distributions of this portfolio to a set of macroeconomic
variables, and then investigate the impact of changes in these variables on the loss distribu-
tion. Summary measures of the impact typically reported are the expected loss (mean of the
distribution) and the maximum losses that can occur for a given probability, usually 95 or
99 per cent.
This approach is quite close to the value-at-risk approach used by individual institutions.
There are two key di⁄erences, however: (i) the focus of our work is not on individual insti-
tutions but on sectors; (ii) we are interested in relating loss distributions to macroeconomic
variables in an attempt to assess longer-term performance and potential risks, rather than
focusing on potential short-term (daily or weekly) losses.
There is a wide range of commercial models in current use that could be of potential
interest (both for market-risk and credit-risk assessment). The closest in spirit to our ob-
jectives is the Credit Portfolio View (CPV) model by Mackenzie and Associates.4 The key
di⁄erence between this model and other commercial models is that it makes default proba-
bilities dependent on a set of future values of macroeconomic variables, and these are then
used in derivations of loss distributions. Virolainen (2004) and Sorge and Virolainen (2006)
use a version of this model and apply it to the analysis of the credit risks in the Finnish
banking sector.
3. Model
The goal of the portfolio approach is to arrive at the loss distribution for a particular portfolio.
At any given point in time, the expected loss in industry s, due to defaults of some of the










4The model is described in detail in Wilson (1997a) and Wilson (1997b).












t denotes the default probability in industry s at time t, exs
t is the portfolio exposure
to industry s at time t, and ls
t is loss given default in industry s at time t.5 The results
obtained in this model will depend on the speci￿cation of these three components. We will
discuss each component separately.
3.1 Probability of default
In modelling default probabilities as functions of macroeconomic variables, two issues need
to be addressed:
(i) the nature of the statistical relationship between default probabilities and macroeco-
nomic variables, and
(ii) the dynamics of default probabilities as a function of the dynamics of the underlying
macroeconomic variables.
To address the ￿rst issue, we start by assuming that the default probability in each
industry is a function of a set of macroeconomic variables:
￿
s = f (x);
where xt is a vector of macroeconomic variables. The problem is to ￿nd a suitable function,
f, which relates macroeconomic variables to default probabilities. It is well known that
when the dependent variable is a probability, postulating a linear relationship between the
explanatory and the dependent variables is, in general, inappropriate. A common approach















t; s = 1;:::;S; (1)
5￿s
t should not be viewed as the probability of default of industry s, since an entity called industry cannot
default. It should be understood either as the average default probability of companies in industry s, or as
the number of companies in industry s that are expected to default at time t. In this paper, we use the










is a 1￿(ML + 1) vector of macroeconomic variables





ML] is an (ML + 1) ￿ 1 coe¢ cient matrix. It can be shown
that this is equivalent to specifying the relationship between the original probabilities and








The marginal e⁄ects of each macroeconomic variable on the default probability, given by
individual elements of bs￿[bs
0;:::;bs







t (1 ￿ ￿
s
t):
This formulation allows for inclusion of industry-speci￿c variables as explanatory variables.
Indeed, inclusion of such variables in (1) will, in general, improve the ￿t of these regressions.
There is, however, a trade-o⁄ between the inclusion of industry-speci￿c variables and the
goal of explaining default probabilities using a set of common risk factors.
The key di⁄erence between (1) and the default probability model in Wilson (1997a) and
Sorge and Virolainen (2006) is that the latter postulate a contemporaneous relationship
between default probabilities and macroeconomic variables. Whether this is warranted de-
pends on the nature of the data used to infer default probabilities. If default probabilities are
inferred from ratings, the assumption implies that the ratings re￿ ect macroeconomic devel-
opments promptly. If, on the other hand, default probabilities are proxied by the observed
number of bankruptcies, the assumption of contemporaneous relationship may not be war-
ranted. As explained in section 4.1, our data are of the latter type. Consequently, we opt
for the speci￿cation with lags.
To deal with the second issue￿ the dynamics of default rates as a function of the dy-
namics of macroeconomic variables￿ one needs to model the evolution of the macroeconomic
variables. From a statistical viewpoint, one of the following two basic approaches can be
chosen:
(i) model the dynamics of each variable separately and then do the estimation using the
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method, or
(ii) model the behaviour of macro variables jointly using a VAR model.
6See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), chapter 15, page 515.
6The CPV and Sorge and Virolainen (2006) use the ￿rst approach, and assume that each
macro variable follows an autoregressive process,7
xm:t = ￿0 +
X
i
￿ixm;t￿i + vm;t; m = 1;:::;M; (3)
where vm;t ￿ n:i:d:(0;￿v). Interdependencies among macro variables are admitted by not
restricting ￿v to a diagonal matrix.
Under the VAR approach, the interdependencies among the macroeconomic variables are
explicitly taken into account by specifying the relationship of the form
Xt = ￿1Xt￿1 + ::: + ￿pXt￿p + ut; (4)
with u ￿ n:i:d:(0;￿u).8 The advantage of the VAR approach is that it o⁄ers two channels of
impact of a macroeconomic shock on default probabilities: the direct impact of a change in
Xm
t on default probabilities, and an indirect impact via the impact on other macroeconomic
variables. Owing to these advantages, in our empirical work we opt for VAR.











t; s = 1;:::;S; (5)
and









This model is estimated to obtain ^ ￿;(^ ￿1;:::; ^ ￿p), and ^ ￿e: The estimated parameters are
then used to simulate future realizations of default rates by dynamic simulation:
(i) starting from a set of initial values of the variables Xt￿1, use (6) to obtain the values
of these variables in the next period. K iterations of this procedure will result in a
7The CPV and Sorge and Virolainen use AR(2) processes.





7K-period-ahead path for the macroeconomic variables:
Xt+1 = ^ ￿1Xt;
Xt+2 = ^ ￿1Xt+1 + ^ ￿2Xt;
:::
Xt+K = ^ ￿1Xt+K￿1 + ::: + ^ ￿KXt;
(ii) substitute the results of the previous step into (5) to obtain a vector of realizations of
default probabilities for all industries, ~ ￿t.
3.2 Exposures
The second component of the model is the exposure of the banking sector to di⁄erent indus-
tries. This information is needed in order to construct the credit portfolio that is represen-
tative of the banks￿lending.
If the only credit instruments in the portfolio under consideration are plain loans, the
de￿nition of exposure is straightforward, and can be taken as the book value of loans to
individual institutions, or industries. The situation is much more complicated if the credit
instruments include o⁄-balance-sheet over-the-counter contracts. In these cases, it is often not
even clear where the credit-risk exposure really lies.9 In the macro stress-testing literature,
the focus is typically on plain loans, and in the empirical part of our work we follow that
tradition.
In constructing the representative bank￿ s credit portfolio, Virolainen (2004) focuses on
lending to the corporate sector, and builds the portfolio by using ￿nancial information from
individual companies. Firms with loans from ￿nancial institutions are divided into industries,
and the value of loans to each industry is obtained by adding the appropriate values of
individual loans.10
In constructing the credit portfolio for our exercise, we focus on sectoral non-mortgage
loans to individuals for business purposes. The data are collected by the O¢ ce of the Super-
intendent of Financial Institutions. A detailed description of the data is provided in section
4.2.
9See, for example, Saunders and Allen (2002), chapter 14 for details.
10For details, see Virolainen (2004), page 20, or Sorge and Virolainen (2006), section 3.2.3.
83.3 Loss given default
The last component of the model is loss given default, specifying the amount of money that
is likely to be lost in the event of the default of an obligor. For an individual obligor, loss
given default at time t is de￿ned as
lt = 1 ￿ rrt;
where rrt is the recovery rate￿ the amount of money that can be recovered on defaulted loans.
It is typically expressed as a percentage of the par amount of the loan. For a given industry,
the recovery rate is the average recovery rate on loans in that industry. The recovery rate
for a credit portfolio is de￿ned in a similar manner.
Whereas the notion of loss given default and recovery rates is conceptually clear, there
are a number of practical challenges in estimating recovery rates and losses in the event of a
default.11 First, there is no clear agreement on what constitutes default. There are several
possibilities12:
(i) the market de￿nition relates defaults to ￿nancial instruments and corresponds to prin-
cipal or interest past due,
(ii) Basel II de￿nes default as past due 90 days on ￿nancial instruments or provisioning,
but default can also be based on a judgmental assessment of a ￿rm by the bank,
(iii) the legal de￿nition links defaults to the bankruptcies of a ￿rm.
Second, recovery rates depend on a number of other factors, such as the debt renegotiation
process, quality of collateral attached to loans, level of seniority of bank loans, and industry
of the issuer.
Third, there is no standard measure of the level of recovery. Two measures are used:
(i) ultimate recovery￿ the amount that the debt holder will recover eventually after the
debt is settled, and
11For an in-depth discussion of the issue, see Servigny and Renault (2004), chapter 4.
12See Servigny and Renault (2004), page 119, or Needham and Verde (2006) for an example of a de￿nition
used by practitioners.
9(ii) the price of debt immediately after default, keeping in mind that this price will be
available only for the fraction of debt that is publicly traded.
Ultimate recovery may be di¢ cult to measure in cases where claims are not settled in
cash, but it is the only way to measure recovery rates to illiquid bank loans.13
In practice, recovery rates are either assumed to be constant or are assumed to be sto-
chastic and drawn from a particular distribution. In both cases, recovery rates are assumed
to be independent of default rates. The evidence, however, seems to suggest that the recovery
rates are not constant, and, more importantly, that there is a link between default rates and
recovery rates. There seems to have been little work done on this issue to date. Sorge and
Virolainen (2006) assume that the recovery rates are constant, and, in light of the issues
discussed above, this may not be a bad place to start.14
3.4 Generating loss distributions
The basic features of the model we will use for stress testing are:
￿ default probability is a function of macroeconomic variables
￿ exposures are given for each industry
￿ losses given default are assumed to be equal across industries and constant
To generate a loss distribution, we proceed as follows:
(i) Generate a path for the macroeconomic variables in the manner described in section
3.1.
(ii) Generate a vector of s random variables with the variance-covariance matrix given
by ^ ￿e. This is done by ￿rst generating a vector Z ￿ N (0;I), and then calculating
~ et = A0Zt, where ^ ￿ =AA0.
13Servigny and Renault (2004), page 123.
14Another interesting possibility is that recovery rates are procyclical: high in expansions and low in
recessions. In that case, the impact on defaults on portfolio losses would be magni￿ed and the assumption
of constant recovery rates would lead to underestimation of losses. While this is an interesting possibility,
strong empirical evidence to support it is lacking.












to obtain the values of default probabilities for each industry at a given point in time.
(iv) For each value of simulated default probability for industry s, compute the expected






















To obtain a loss distribution, a large number of realizations of ￿t are generated and, for each
realization, steps (i)￿ (iv) are repeated.
4. Data
The key issue is which industries to include in the aggregate credit portfolio. Data on the
number of defaults and exposures are available for the following industries: (i) accommo-
dation and food services, (ii) agriculture, (iii) construction, (iv) manufacturing, (v) mining,
quarrying, and oil wells, (vi) retail, (vii) transportation, (viii) wholesale trade, (ix) utility,
and (x) others (private non-pro￿t institutions, religious, health and education institutions,
etc.).
Unfortunately, not all the data are usable, either because of incomplete exposure coverage
or a large number of periods with no bankruptcies in particular industries.15 In making
a decision on which industries to include, we are guided primarily by the occurrence of
bankruptcies and include the industries in which bankruptcies have been most frequent over
the sample period: (i) manufacturing (MAN), (ii) construction (CON), (iii) retail (RET),
and (iv) accommodation and food services (ACC). These are the industries with, on average,
the highest credit exposures as well. The data used are quarterly, spanning the period from
1987Q1 to 2005Q4.16
15The latter problem results in di¢ culties in estimating default probability regressions.
16Details regarding data de￿nitions, sources, and sample sizes are provided in Appendix A.
114.1 Defaults by industry
We construct this series by relying on two di⁄erent series: the total number of bankruptcies
by industry, and the total number of establishments in each industry.17,18 The frequencies of
these two series do not coincide: the number of bankruptcies is available monthly, whereas
establishment counts are available semi-annually. The quarterly bankruptcy rate series is
obtained as follows:
￿ determine the total number of bankruptcies occurring in each quarter by summing the
monthly numbers for each industry
￿ convert the semi-annual establishment counts into quarterly by taking the average of
two adjacent semi-annual values to ￿ll the missing quarterly value
￿ at each point in time, divide the total number of bankruptcies in each industry by the
establishment count for that industry
The question is whether the bankruptcy rates constructed in this way correspond to
bankruptcy rates applicable to individual banks.19 It is very likely that the denominator of
our series overestimates the number of establishments in the loans portfolio of banks, since it
implies that all establishments in an industry are in the loans portfolio. This would lead to
underestimation of bankruptcy rates. On the other hand, the number of companies that go
bankrupt may be overestimating the number of bankruptcies observed by individual banks.
This would result in an upward bias in the bankruptcy rates. The net e⁄ect is di¢ cult to
predict.20
A plot of bankruptcy rates for the selected industries is shown in Figure 1.
17Statistics Canada de￿nes an establishment in the following way. ￿A statistical establishment is the
production entity or the smallest grouping of production entities which:
(a) Produces a homogeneous set of goods or services;
(b) Does not cross provincial boundaries; and
(c) Provides data on the value of output together with the cost of principal intermediate inputs used
along with the cost and quantity of labour resources used to produce the output.
For example, a plant in the manufacturing industry which provides accounting information regarding the
value of shipments (sales), direct costs and labour costs is considered a single establishment. However, two
stores in the retail industry may be considered one establishment if the accounting information, described in
item (c) above, is not available separately, but is combined at a higher level.￿
18The number of establishments in each industry is obtained from Statistics Canada￿ s Business Register
database.
19We thank Meyer Aaron and Jim Armstrong for drawing our attention to this issue.
20Note, however, that Fitch, a rating agency, uses a similar method to compute default rates; see Needham
and Verde (2006) for details.

































































































































MAN CON RET ACC
Figure 1: Bankruptcy rates
For each industry, the bankruptcy rate at a point in time represents the fraction of ￿rms
that went bankrupt out of the total number of ￿rms in that industry. For example, in the
manufacturing industry, the value at 2005Q4 is 0.157, meaning that 0.157 per cent of the
￿rms in that industry went bankrupt in the last quarter of 2005.21
There are several notable features to this data:
￿ there was an overall increase in bankruptcy rates in all industries during the recession
in the early 1990s
￿ bankruptcy rates have, in general, been declining over the past 10 years, with the
exception of accommodation￿ which experienced a second peak in the mid-1990s￿ and
manufacturing, which has been on an upward trend over the past ￿ve years
￿ bankruptcy rates in the construction industry were low and stable over the sample
period
21For a recent analysis of bankruptcies in Canada, see Lecavalier (2006).
13Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
MAN CON RET ACC
Mean (%) 0:15 0:06 0:09 0:13
Std. dev. 0:04 0:03 0:03 0:05
Skewness 0:71 0:59 0:22 0:33
Kurtosis -0:08 ￿0:32 ￿0:51 ￿0:92
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for bankruptcy rates by industry
Manufacturing and accommodation bankruptcy rates display the highest volatility, with
standard deviations of 0.04 and 0.05, respectively. Preliminary statistical analysis of the data
indicates that there is some evidence of asymmetry, summarized by the positive skewness
coe¢ cient. Interestingly, all of the variables are platykurtic; i.e., they have ￿ atter peaks and
less probability mass in tails than the normal density. The latter property is not surprising,
given that the data are bounded to a [0;1] interval.
The assumption of normality cannot be rejected for the retail industry, but it is rejected
for the other three industries.22
The correlation matrix for the industries is
2





0:59 0:72 0:81 1
3
7 7 7 7
5
:
All values are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 per cent level. Default rates are clearly
highly correlated across industries. This may have important systemic consequences, espe-
cially if the portfolio is heavily exposed to industries with highly correlated defaults.
In using these data to compute losses in the loans portfolio of the banking industry, we
assume that each ￿rm has an equal impact of each bankruptcy on losses. This implies that
the exposures are equally divided among the ￿rms so that, for given recovery rates, there is
no di⁄erence in impact of any individual ￿rm￿ s bankruptcy on the losses. This assumption
is clearly false: Virolainen (2004) ￿nds that, of over 58,000 companies in Finland, the largest
3,000 account for roughly 94 per cent of the outstanding loans￿ but the only solution is to
22The results are based on the Shapiro-Wilk￿ s W test, 95 per cent con￿dence interval. Normality is weakly
rejected for the construction industry￿ the associated p-value is 0.04.
































































Figure 2: Share of foreign currency loans in total loans to non-￿nancial business sector
construct the data using the bottom-up approach and verify the extent to which the violation
of this assumption impacts the results. This issue is discussed further in section 7.
4.2 Sectoral exposures
Sectoral exposure data used in the empirical exercise consist of non-mortgage loans issued to
individuals and others for business purposes. The available data span the period 1994Q1 to
2005Q4. The loans reported refer to loans in both domestic and foreign currencies.
Figure 2 shows the relative share of foreign currency loans in the credit portfolio of the
Big Six Canadian banks over the sample period. Whereas the share clearly ￿ uctuates, with
a downward trend over the last three to four years, it is still relatively high, in the range of
40￿ 45 per cent.23
23The reason for this decrease is most likely in the appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S.
dollar over this period. This hypothesis is based on two considerations:
(i) the majority of loans are either to the United States or are denominated in U.S. dollars, and
(ii) whereas the book value of these loans is ￿xed, their value in domestic currency each period is calculated
using the market exchange rate for that period.
15It is clear that a comprehensive analysis of credit risks in the aggregate loans portfolio of
Canadian banks should be based on total exposures, but this is far from straightforward. At
the most basic level, one would have to trace these loans to each country and each industry
of that country, and then model the sectoral default rates in foreign industries in a way that
follows the procedure for the domestic sector. Depending on the geographical allocation of
the loans, this would necessitate a multi-country model of macroeconomic variables. Simpler
but potentially less satisfactory solutions, such as focusing on only the major geographical
exposure, might be feasible.
In addition, the value of foreign exposures will depend on ￿ uctuations in the foreign
exchange rate. Whether this is of concern depends on the extent to which the banks hedge
the foreign exchange (FX) risks. Ideally, one would like to have a measure of ￿FX-hedged￿
exposures. These data are, unfortunately, not available, and the extent to which the banks
engage in hedging this risk, or how successful they are in hedging it, is not clear.
In light of these considerations, we focus on the domestic currency portion of the loans
portfolio.24,25 Figure 3 shows the evolution of the shares of domestic currency loans exposures
by industry.
Of the four industries analyzed, the exposure to the manufacturing industry is the largest,
with values in the range of 18￿ 26 per cent and a slight upward trend over the sample period.
Exposures to retail and construction have ranged between 10 and 15 per cent; the exposure
to the accommodation industry has been stable, at around 5 per cent.
In the stress-testing exercise, one has to decide whether to use actual exposures at a
particular point in time, or historical averages. We opt to use the actual exposures at the
end of 2004Q3. However, given the nature of the data in our sample, the di⁄erence between
using averages and actual exposures is, with the possible exception of manufacturing, not
signi￿cant.
24Virolainen (2004) does not discuss this issue, but, given the procedure used to construct the portfolio,
it appears that the focus is on the domestic currency loans only. No information is provided to assess the
extent to which the Finnish sector is engaged in foreign currency lending activities.
25If we want to investigate the impact of changes in exchange rates on credit risks, there are two channels:
(i) the impact of FX on default probabilities of the domestic sectors, and
(ii) the impact of FX on the exposures of foreign currency loans.
By focusing on domestic currency loans, we ignore the second channel.
16Exposures by industry































































MAN CON RET ACC
Figure 3: Share of loans to selected industries in total domestic currency loans
4.3 Macroeconomic variables
The macroeconomic variables selected for the exercise are divided into endogenous and ex-
ogenous, according to their role in the VAR model. The endogenous variables selected are
Canada￿ s GDP, which is converted into the GDP growth rate,26 and Canada￿ s real interest
rate. These variables are typically present in macro stress-testing exercises regardless of the
approach used.
In addition to these, we selected a set of exogenous variables that might constitute im-
portant sources of stress for the Canadian ￿nancial industry:
￿ the Bank of Canada commodity price index, converted into the growth rate
￿ the U.S. real GDP growth rate
￿ the U.S. real interest rate
The selection of exogenous variables re￿ ects the close ties of the Canadian economy with
26The growth rate for variable x is computed as gx = log(xt) ￿ log(xt￿1).
17the U.S. economy, and the importance of commodity prices in Canada. All series are quar-
terly, with the sample spanning the period 1987Q1 to 2005Q4. Various statistical tests
suggest that the VAR(5) model is the best speci￿cation.
5. Macroeconomic Scenarios
The key component of stress tests is scenario analysis. The type of scenario selected depends
on our priors regarding the possible causes of deviations from the normal operating conditions.
Although there is a wide range of possibilities, we select the ones that are most pertinent to
Canada. The scenarios considered are:
(i) a 20 per cent increase in the commodity price index,
(ii) a 4 per cent decrease in the growth rate of U.S. real GDP,
(iii) a 200 basis points increase in the U.S. real interest rate,
(iv) a combination scenario, which examines the e⁄ects of the joint occurrence of the ￿rst
two scenarios.
The magnitudes of change in the scenario variable are set based on historical precedents,
with the focus on infrequent but historically plausible events that would be deemed as devi-
ations from normal operating conditions.
As described in section 3, the key assumptions used in our exercise are: (i) the recovery
rate is constant and the value is set at 0:5, and (ii) the exposures are set at the value that
prevailed in 2004Q3. Under these conditions, the properties of the loss distribution will
depend on the stochastic properties of the default rates, given by equation (5). In each
scenario, there are, in principle, two channels of impact on default probabilities:
(i) the direct impact of a change in the scenario variable on the default probability, and
(ii) an indirect impact, via the impact of the change in scenario variable on other macro-
economic variables.27
27The AR-based approach described in section 3.2 does not allow for the presence of the second channel.
18In our experiments, we assume that both channels operate under the scenarios involving
domestic macroeconomic variables. The impact of foreign macroeconomic variables on default
probabilities is assumed to occur via the impact of these variables on domestic macroeconomic
variables.
In terms of implementation of scenarios, the question of the initial values for the macro-
economic variables arises. One could use either the values prevailing at a given point in
time, or historical averages over past values. For the purposes of monitoring going forward,
the former approach is preferable, since it assesses the impact of a scenario taking the most
recent levels as starting points. The latter approach is useful when one is trying to assess
potential losses under normal operating conditions. In implementing the scenarios, we opt
for a combination of the approaches, and set the initial values for macroeconomic variables
at their average value over 12 months preceding the stress event. Starting from these values,
each scenario is implemented by setting the scenario variable to its postulated value, tracing
its impact on other variables through VAR, and taking the realized values of the variables
k periods ahead. The impact of di⁄erent scenarios on the loss distribution reported in the
next section is at the one-year horizon.
6. Results
The results reported in this section are based on the models given by (5) and (6), which are
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and
Xt = ￿1Xt￿1 + ::: + ￿pXt￿p + ut:
In implementing each scenario, the paths for default probabilities under stress are arrived
at in the manner described in section 3.1. Loss distributions are generated according to the
procedure outlined in section 3.4. For each scenario, two sets of results are reported. The ￿rst
set describes the impact of a given shock on the macro variables implied by the estimated







Table 2: The impact of explanatory variables in logistic regressions
The coe¢ cient values and diagnostics associated with the VAR model (6) are provided in
Appendix B. The impact of macroeconomic variables on default probabilities in each industry
is summarized in Table 2. The values in the table are computed by summing the value of
coe¢ cients associated with each macro variable at all estimated lags. Tests for the number of
lags suggest the speci￿cation with four lags for each macro variable. The explanatory power
of the resulting industry-level logistic regression is high, with R2 0.48 in accommodation
to 0.72 in the construction industry. The impact of macroeconomic variables on default
probabilities is consistent across regressions and intuitively plausible. A decrease in GDP is
associated with increases in default rates in all industries, with the greatest impact felt by
manufacturing. Increases in domestic interest rates are accompanied by increases in default
rates, with the greatest impact felt by the retail and construction industries.
6.1 Increase in commodity prices
An increase in commodity prices is a scenario that has been deemed quite relevant in light
of recent developments in the world commodity markets. In our model, commodity prices
are measured using the commodity price index. This index consists of energy and non-
energy subcomponents. The weight of the former in the index is roughly one-third. More
importantly, most of the volatility in the index is accounted for by the volatility of its energy
subcomponent. In light of this, one may interpret the commodity-price increase in this
scenario as being due to an increase in energy prices.
Commodity prices are assumed to be determined in the world markets, and, from the
viewpoint of the Canadian economy, are taken as exogenous. This is re￿ ected in the status
of commodity prices as an exogenous variable in the VAR model. A change in commodity
prices impacts the default probabilities in the domestic industries via its impact on domestic
macroeconomic variables. The impact of a commodity-price shock on Canada￿ s GDP and
interest rate is summarized in Figures 5 and 6. For each variable, the ￿gures show two
paths￿ under no stress and under stress￿ over two years following the initial shock. The
paths are generated using the VAR model (6). An increase in commodity prices results in a
20Loss distribution
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Figure 4: Loss distribution under scenario 1
moderate but somewhat persistent decrease in output, and an increase in the interest rate.
The loss distribution under this scenario is shown in Figure 4. Statistics given in Table 3
suggest that the impact of this scenario on expected and unexpected losses is minor: expected
losses increase by roughly 6 per cent, and the 99 per cent value-at-risk (VaR) increases by 3
per cent. The relatively low impact of this scenario on losses is not surprising, in light of the
fact that the impact of a change in commodity prices on the macroeconomic variables that
drive industry-level default rates is small.
Commodity-price shock No stress Stress
Expected loss 0.046 0.050
Unexpected loss (99% VaR) 0.085 0.088
Unexpected loss (99.9% VaR) 0.097 0.100
Table 3: Expected and unexpected losses under scenario 2
6.2 Decrease in the U.S. real GDP growth rate
A 4 per cent decrease in the U.S. GDP growth rate may seem an extreme scenario, but in light
of the growth rates of the U.S. economy over the past few years it would amount to no more
than a mild recession. Given that the initial value for the U.S. GDP growth rate (the average
over 12 months preceding the stress scenario) was 3.47 per cent, the decrease considered here
would bring that rate to -0.53 per cent. Smaller rates of decrease would represent merely a
slowdown. The performance of the U.S. economy is taken as exogenously given, and its impact
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Figure 5: Impact of commodity prices on Canada￿ s output
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Figure 6: Impact of commodity prices on Canada￿ s interest rate
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Figure 7: Impact of a U.S. GDP shock on Canada￿ s output
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Figure 8: Impact of a U.S. GDP shock on Canada￿ s interest rate
23Loss distribution
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Figure 9: Loss distribution under scenario 2
on Canadian industries is assumed to occur via domestic macroeconomic variables. The
plausibility of this assumption depends on the sectors considered. For industries that export
heavily to the United States, the direct impact of U.S. economic conditions is probably non-
trivial. To the extent that this is the case, our assumption would lead to an underestimation
of the overall impact on those industries.
Paths for Canada￿ s output and interest rate following a decrease in the U.S. GDP growth
rate are shown in Figures 7 and 8. A decrease in Canada￿ s GDP growth rate is much larger
than under the ￿rst scenario, although not su¢ cient to push the Canadian economy into a
recession. The impact on Canada￿ s interest rate is more pronounced than under the ￿rst
scenario, but the impact is negligible after six quarters.
Given the relatively strong impact of the U.S. GDP shock on both Canadian macroeco-
nomic variables, one would expect a more pronounced impact on losses. This is con￿rmed
by the results shown in Figure 9 and Table 4. Loss distribution under stress is shifted to the
right, with expected losses increasing by some 30 per cent relative to the no-stress case, and
99 per cent VaR increasing by 17 per cent from 0.085 to 0.099.
24Path for Canadian output










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
period
No stress Stress
Figure 10: Impact of a change in the U.S. interest rate on Canada￿ s output
Path for Canadian interest rate
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Figure 11: Impact of a change in the U.S. interest rate on Canada￿ s interest rate
25U.S. GDP shock No stress Stress
Expected loss 0.046 0.060
Unexpected loss (99% VaR) 0.085 0.099
Unexpected loss (99.9% VaR) 0.097 0.111
Table 4: Expected and unexpected losses under scenario 3
Loss distribution
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Figure 12: Loss distribution under scenario 3
6.3 Increases in U.S. real interest rates
In this scenario, we consider a tightening of 200 basis points in the U.S. real interest rate.
The initial value of the real interest rate is 0.18 per cent (the average over the 12 months
preceding the stress scenario), so that the tightening of the magnitude considered here would
put the real interest rate at 2.18 per cent. This is a situation not unlike the one experienced
over the past couple of years in the United States. As is clear from Figures 10 and 11,
the impact on Canadian variables is minimal, and similar to the one under the ￿rst scenario.
Figure 12 contains loss distributions for both scenarios; summary statistics are given in Table
5. As anticipated, the impact on expected and unexpected losses is small and similar to the
one under the ￿rst scenario.
6.4 Combination scenario
The last scenario considered is a combination scenario, consisting of a simultaneous increase
in commodity prices and a decline in the U.S. GDP growth rate. This is clearly the worst-
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Figure 13: Impact on output under combination scenario
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Figure 14: Impact on interest rate under combination scenario
27Interest rate shocks No stress Stress
Expected loss 0.046 0.049
Unexpected loss (99% VaR) 0.085 0.088
Unexpected loss (99.9% VaR) 0.097 0.102
Table 5: Expected and unexpected losses under scenario 3
case scenario of all considered in this paper, since it combines the negative impact of the two
exogenous variables considered in scenarios 1 and 2. The magnitudes of the shocks are the
same as in those scenarios.
The combination scenario may seem counterintuitive: everything else being the same,
one would expect that a decline in the U.S. GDP growth rate would be accompanied by
a decrease in world commodity prices, due to a lower demand. This need not occur if the
growth in other parts of the world continues to be robust, not only sustaining the demand
but even putting some upward pressure on world commodity prices.
The impact of this scenario on Canada￿ s output and interest rates is summarized in
Figures 13 and 14. Canada￿ s output declines over two years following a decline in U.S.
output. The slowdown is particularly sharp in the ￿rst year. The trend reverses in the
second year, but the output is still well below the no-stress case at the end of the two-year
period. The interest rate initially increases above the no-stress level, but the impact is minor
after six quarters.
The loss distribution under this scenario is shown in Figure 15, and the summary statistics
are reported in Table 6. Perhaps not surprisingly, the impact of this scenario on the loss
distribution is signi￿cant. The expected losses increase by 41 per cent, and the unexpected
losses by 22 per cent (99 per cent VaR). In terms of the overall impact, this is clearly the
￿ worst-case scenario.￿ Note that the overall impact in this scenario is more than the sum of
the impacts of scenarios 1 and 2.
Multiple shocks No stress Stress
Expected loss 0.046 0.065
Unexpected loss (99% VaR) 0.085 0.104
Unexpected loss (99.9% VaR) 0.097 0.117
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Figure 15: Loss distribution under scenario 4
6.5 Discussion
An assessment of the results of the foregoing exercises depends on one￿ s criteria. Have we
uncovered sources of risk that could pose serious threats to the banking sector? That depends
on the ability of the banking sector to deal with losses of the magnitudes that occur in these
scenarios. One way to gauge the banking sector￿ s ability to withstand the shocks is to look
at the loan-loss provisions￿ the amounts set aside by the banks to cover losses. Loan-loss
provisions are forward looking and re￿ ect banks￿views on the magnitudes of risk, if not its
sources. Figure 16 depicts the data on average historical loan-loss provisions, together with
the range of losses generated in our experiments. Both measures are expressed as a ratio
to total loans (exposures). The rectangular area on the graph represents the range of losses
that we are able to generate under no stress (lower bound) and under the worst-case stress
scenario (upper bound). The horizontal line at 0.09 represents historical average loan-loss
provisions over the sample period. As the graph shows, the results generated under various
scenarios are close to the average loan-loss provisions. Furthermore, the relationship between
historical loan-loss provisions and stress-induced losses is characterized by three distinct
periods: (i) from 1996Q1 until 2000Q3, the actual loan-loss provisions are in the range of the
stress-induced losses, (ii) from 2000Q3 to 2003Q1, the provisions exceed even the worst-case
scenario losses, and (iii) during the most recent period, starting in 2003Q3, the provisions
are below the expected losses.




















































































































































Figure 16: Historical loan-loss provisions
underprovisioning over the past three years and that they overprovisioned in the period
2000Q3￿ 2003Q1, but we urge extreme caution in this respect. The discrepancy between
actual provisions and stress-induced losses may be a result of model de￿ciencies as much
as of the problems with actual provisions. In fact, one could easily rationalize the apparent
overprovisions by arguing that the result is due to the fact that, during the period in question,
the banks were exposed to the high-tech sector, the collapse of which in early 2000 led to
increases in provisions. Since our portfolio does not contain the high-tech sector, the model
would not be able to capture this aspect of the banks￿provisioning behaviour.
A simple solution would be to extend portfolio coverage, ultimately including all indus-
tries, all credit instruments, and all sources of risk, real or perceived, over the sample period.
This is hardly feasible. The focus on a subset of the credit portfolio may be the only feasible
way of performing these tests. It is, however, important to remember the implications of this
strategy. First, the focus is a re￿ ection of the view regarding the most likely source of poten-
tial vulnerabilities. The focus on the corporate loans part of the portfolio re￿ ects the view
that the problems are likely to originate there. Second, since we focus on one subset of the
portfolio, a comparison with the historical loan-loss provisions may not be very informative,
30and it is in general misleading to talk about over- or underprovisioning in this context.
Nonetheless, these types of exercises have a role to play in an overall assessment of the
soundness of the banking sector, and, more broadly, the ￿nancial system. By focusing on
di⁄erent parts of the credit portfolio and performing these exercises, one may get a better
sense of the relative soundness of di⁄erent parts of the portfolio and possible sources of risk.
In addition, stress tests under di⁄erent scenarios may give us a better sense of the relative
importance of di⁄erent sources of risk, thus leading to a ranking of risks in terms of their
impact on the losses. For example, our exercise implies that decreases in U.S. GDP pose
the largest risks in terms of the losses on the loans portfolio. At the opposite extreme, this
part of the banking sector portfolio displays very little sensitivity to interest rate movements,
which indicates that interest rate developments may be relatively less important in terms of
potential sources of risk.
7. Summary and Further Work
An assessment of ￿nancial system stability and potential vulnerabilities is a complex exercise,
because of the nature of the entities comprising the ￿nancial system and the wide range of
possible scenarios that may result in abnormal operating conditions. These complexities
have been dealt with by focusing on a set of entities that are deemed to be ￿systemically
important￿for a given ￿nancial system, and by selecting as scenarios those rare but plausible
events that have caused abnormal operating conditions in the past, or that could cause them
in the future.
In this work, we have focused on one set of entities￿ the Canadian banking sector￿ and
investigated losses in the domestic loans portfolio of this sector as a function of the changing
circumstances of di⁄erent industries in which these loans reside. These circumstances can be
characterized using a variety of balance-sheet indicators, but we have opted for a di⁄erent
approach, by focusing on one summary measure￿ sectoral probabilities of default￿ and mod-
elling this measure as a function of macroeconomic variables. This model has enabled us to
assess the interrelationship between the macroeconomic environment and sectoral defaults in
the past, as well as perform a series of tests under di⁄erent possible scenarios. The scenarios
selected re￿ ect the sources of vulnerabilities that are commonly considered as ￿ typical￿for
Canada, rather than a re￿ ection of the ￿ concerns of the moment.￿ The tools underlying the
analysis in this paper are general and can be easily applied to other scenarios.
There are a number of possibilities for further work within the existing framework:
31￿ Structural macroeconomic models. The interrelationships among the macro variables
are summarized using a reduced-form statistical model. One would, ideally, like to have
a structural model that would be ￿ exible enough to incorporate all variables of interest.
One possibility is to integrate this type of work with central banks￿macroeconomic
models.
￿ Sectoral-level simulations with a better measure of the average default probability in
di⁄erent sectors. We use bankruptcy rates as proxies for default probabilities. A
di⁄erent proxy could be obtained by inferring default probabilities from credit ratings.
￿ Firm-level simulations. Loss distributions in this paper are based on industry-level
simulations of default probabilities. An alternative, used in Virolainen (2004), is to
work with the microdata, and generate default events at the ￿rm level. Results based
on ￿rm-level simulations of default probabilities are possibly closer to the experiences
of individual banks. In addition, ￿rm-level simulations would enable us to generate
default events of a small number of companies with large loans, thus leading to the
possibility of small-probability extreme losses.
￿ Enlarge the subset of the credit portfolio by including additional industries on the
corporate loans side.
Other possibilities include enlarging the subset of the credit portfolio by including addi-
tional industries on the corporate loans side, including the personal sector loans, and ana-
lyzing di⁄erent types of risk (such as market risk). We reiterate that the analysis presented
herein is not a substitute for institution-level stress tests. The two approaches to stress
testing￿ top-down and bottom-up￿ are best viewed as complements. The top-down ap-
proach can be used to identify macroeconomic scenarios that can lead to vulnerabilities. The
impact on individual institutions must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
A well-understood limitation of VaR-based stress-testing models is that they do not in-
corporate feedback e⁄ects. They simply provide implications of the ￿ ￿rst-round impact￿of a
scenario. The implicit assumptions are twofold:
(i) losses are assessed under the assumption that ￿nancial institutions do not do anything
to alleviate the impact of shocks, and
(ii) losses in the ￿nancial sector have no impact on the macroeconomic variables.
32These assumptions may not be problematic if one is interested in the very short run
(e.g., one-day VaR), but they do matter from a macro-￿nancial stability viewpoint. The ￿rst
assumption implies that one cannot assess losses arising from situations in which exposures
to common risk factors lead ￿nancial institutions to simultaneously adjust their portfolio
positions, leading to an ￿ evaporation of liquidity￿or ￿ liquidity black holes.￿ 28 The second
assumption precludes an assessment of the impact of phenomena such as stress-induced
tightening of credit conditions on the ￿nancial position of businesses and households, and
their ability to meet their ￿nancial obligations in the future.
A common feature of these examples is that a shock that initially has a local impact may
result in the second-round systemic impact. Whether this type of assessment is within the
domain of stress testing is debatable. It is clear that work along these lines is needed to
deepen our understanding of systemic risk.
28Persaud (2003) provides a good discussion of the issues.
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35Appendix A: Data De￿nitions and Sources
￿ Sectoral Loan Exposures (1994Q2￿ 2005Q4). Source: O¢ ce of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (OSFI)
￿Manufacturing: Total domestic currency loans of the Big Six Canadian banks to
the manufacturing sector.
￿Construction: Total domestic currency loans of the Big Six Canadian banks to
the construction sector.
￿Retail: Total domestic currency loans of the Big Six Canadian banks to the retail
sector.
￿Accommodation: Total domestic currency loans of the Big Six Canadian banks to
the accommodation sector.
￿ Sectoral Bankruptcy Rates (1987Q1￿ 2005Q4). Source: O¢ ce of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcies (OSB) and Statistics Canada.
￿Manufacturing: Total number of bankruptcies in the manufacturing sector divided
by the total number of establishments in that sector.
￿Construction: Total number of bankruptcies in the construction sector divided by
the total number of establishments in that sector.
￿Retail: Total number of bankruptcies in the retail sector divided by the total
number of establishments in that sector.
￿Accommodation: Total number of bankruptcies in the accomodation sector di-
vided by the total number of establishments in that sector.
￿ Loan-Loss Provisions (1996Q1￿ 2006Q1): Percentage of total loans set aside for provi-
sioning by the Big Six Canadian banks. Source: OSFI.
￿ Macroeconomic Variables (1987Q1￿ 2005Q4). Source: CANSIM.
￿Real GDP Growth Rate: Annualized quarterly growth rate of Canadian (U.S.)
real GDP.
￿Real Interest Rate: 3-month Canadian (U.S.) real interest rate.
￿Commodity Price Index: Commodity Price Index (U.S. dollars); 1982￿ 90 = 100.
36Appendix B: VAR Estimation Results
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria




Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -302.4456 NA 23.30714 8.824510 8.889266 8.850201
1 -167.1491 258.8280 0.518493 5.018815 5.213085 5.095889
2 -152.0279 28.05091 0.375768 4.696462 5.020245* 4.824918*
3 -150.7361 2.321578 0.406816 4.774959 5.228256 4.954797
4 -150.2089 0.916823 0.450614 4.875621 5.458431 5.106841
5 -138.9303 18.96123* 0.365817 4.664645 5.376969 4.947248
6 -133.7348 8.433150 0.354642* 4.629995* 5.471832 4.963980
7 -133.4297 0.477547 0.396706 4.737094 5.708444 5.122461
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
37VAR Residual Normality Tests
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
H0: residuals are multivariate normal
Sample: 1987Q1 2005Q4
Included observations: 71
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 0.134286 0.213387 1 0.6441
2 -0.258878 0.793044 1 0.3732
Joint 1.006432 2 0.6046
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1 2.478377 0.804936 1 0.3696
2 2.135908 2.208856 1 0.1372
Joint 3.013792 2 0.2216
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1 1.018323 2 0.6010
2 3.001901 2 0.2229
Joint 4.020224 4 0.4033
38VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests




















Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
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